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Abstract: This paper explores how the European Commission promotes the concept of Sustainable
Urban Mobility Planning (SUMP) among European cities. Despite the strong uptake of the SUMP
concept, mobility-related problems persist in European municipalities. Linking theoretical approaches
to understand the diffusion of policies with empirical findings from working with cities in the SUMP
context, this article explores channels of policy diffusion and investigates shortcomings related to the
respective approaches. Studies on the diffusion, the transfer and the convergence of policies identify
formal hierarchy, coercion, competition, learning and networking, and the diffusion of international
norms as channels for policy transfer. The findings which are presented in this paper are twofold:
First, the paper finds evidence that the Commission takes different roles and uses all mechanisms in
parallel, albeit with different intensity. It concludes that the approaches to explain policy diffusion are
not competing or mutually exclusive but are applied by the same actor to address different aspects of a
policy field, or to reach out to different actors. Second, the article provides first evidence of factors that
limit the mechanisms’ abilities to directly influence urban mobility systems and mobility behaviour.
Keywords: sustainable urban mobility planning; sump; policy diffusion; policy transfer; paradigm;
urban mobility; transport planning
1. Introduction
Urban areas are attracting more and more people. In 2018, 74% of all Europeans lived in towns
and cities, and this share is expected to increase over the coming decades [1]. Growing population,
urban sprawl and the extension of commuting distances beyond municipal boundaries intensifies the
demand for urban mobility, thus aggravating congestion, environmental issues and social disparities.
About one fourth of European greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions stem from the transport sector,
and urban mobility is responsible for 23% of all transport-related GHG emissions in the EU [2]. A large
share of cities in the EU struggles with poor air quality, noise pollution and an intolerable number of
urban road accidents [3].
Urbanisation requires better coordinated, sustainable and future-proof transport systems in
functional areas. In its Communication on competitive and resource-efficient urban mobility,
the European Commission acknowledges the importance of supporting local authorities “so that
all cities across the Union can achieve a step-change in their efforts for more competitive and
resource-efficient urban mobility” [4]. Still, the impact assessment accompanying the 2013 Urban
Mobility Directive found that most European cities have not solved their urban mobility challenges,
and that deficient planning practices on the local level endangered key European objectives, including
a competitive and resource-efficient transport system, the EU’s future prosperity and its international
economic competitiveness [2] (p. 18). In an attempt to address these shortcomings, the Commission
introduced the concept of Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning (SUMP) with its 2013 Urban
Mobility Package.
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In August 2020, the eltis city database reported almost 830 finalised SUMPs and more than
100 plans under preparation for the EU [5]. This article aims at understanding how the European
Commission promotes the take-up of the SUMP concept in municipal administrations and how these
approaches link to each other. In the article, I review and apply findings from the literature on policy
diffusion, policy transfer and policy convergence. It is not the intention of this paper to examine the
differences and complementarities of these approaches or to evaluate their adequacy for explaining the
diffusion of the SUMP concept in the EU. Rather, assuming that all approaches provide insights on the
mechanisms how policies diffuse among receiving actors [6,7], the paper brings together theoretical
approaches to describe and understand the diffusion of policies on the one hand, and empirical findings
from practical work with cities in the SUMP context on the other hand.
Second, noting that, despite this proliferation of sustainable urban mobility planning, private car
use remains the dominant mode throughout European cities, the limits of the transfer mechanisms
require explication. Building on qualitative data from the evaluation of an EU-sponsored urban
mobility leaning programme, the article provides a first and preliminary approach to identify the
shortcomings of policy transfer mechanisms that lead to weak policy impacts on the ground.
The article proceeds as follows: After providing a short insight into the materials and data
sources in chapter 2, chapter 3 describes key elements of the SUMP concept. Chapter 4 reviews the
political science literature on policy transfer, policy diffusion, and policy convergence. It derives and
briefly describes key mechanisms—formal hierarchy, coercion, competition, networking, and norm
diffusion—and links these findings to empirical data on mobility planning in the EU. The discussion
and conclusion section compiles the findings from chapter 4 to derive an overview picture of the
Commission’s efforts to alter urban mobility planning practices in the European municipalities.
For reasons of simplification, the Commission refers to the Directorate-General for Mobility and
Transport (DG MOVE) and its implementation agencies, most notably the Innovation and Networks
Executive Agency (INEA). It will be shown later that other Directorate-Generals (DGs), including the
DG for Environment and the DG for Regional and Urban Policy, influence urban mobility decisions in
the EU. Where activities of these DGs are considered, this is made explicit.
2. Materials, Data Sources and Methods
The paper builds upon experiences and data from the evaluation of the CIVITAS SUMPs Up
project, which was conducted from September 2016 to February 2020. The project received funding
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement
no 690669.
During the scientific evaluation of the project, both a quantitative large-N survey among
100 European cities that participated in a learning programme and qualitative methods, such as
interviews, participant reports and focus groups, were used. (The qualitative data collected in the
SUMPs Up project were compiled in two evaluation reports (Deliverable 7.4 and 7.5). The reports are
currently (May 2020) being reviewed and will be published on the project’s website https://sumps-up.eu
after approval of the European Commission.) Moreover, the paper builds on participatory research
from the author’s active involvement in the SUMPs Up project, including the preparation of SUMP
topic guides, the organisation of side events to European mobility conferences, and teaching activities
during learning events for cities and practitioners. The development of European Urban Mobility policy
was assessed via desk research, building on the analysis of policy documents and scientific literature.
The paper links key mechanisms of policy diffusion and policy transfer, which were derived
from a review of case examples (e.g., on energy policy) and existing review articles e.g., [6,8] to
the findings of the SUMPs Up project evaluation. As a note of caution, it needs to be mentioned
that policy outputs—i.e., the adoption of SUMPs in European municipalities—can be measured
in a straightforward way. Policy outcomes—i.e., the implementation of sustainable urban mobility
measures or policy impacts—such as changes in modal shares, noise levels, or greenhouse gas emissions,
however, are only indirectly related to the diffusion of the SUMP concept and shaped through a variety
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of case-specific intervening variables. Factors range from the political commitment of local politicians,
to the national legal framework, up to the influence of competing policy areas on the national or
EU level. The available empirical data may open lines of reasoning and give a first orientation but
are far from providing systemic and generalisable evidence for explaining the latter dimensions of
policy change.
3. Background
The SUMP concept aims at altering mobility planning practices in European cities. Rather than
prescribing specific policy instruments, such as the introduction of congestion charges or parking
management systems, the concept provides a process standard for urban mobility planning.
The approach inter alia promotes policy integration, interdisciplinary planning, involvement of
the public and of stakeholders, and a stronger focus on people and quality of life instead of on
undisturbed traffic flows. The SUMP cycle—which is an idealised planning stages approach—contains
extensive elements of public participation, expert consultation, the use of scenarios, policy integration,
and continuous monitoring and evaluation. In short, the SUMP concept aims at altering mobility
planning practices in local administrations from a traffic-centred, predict and provide approach
e.g., [9–11] into people centred demand management planning. Table 1 depicts the differences between
the traditional planning paradigm and the SUMP approach:
Table 1. Traditional transport planning and Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning [12].
Traditional Transport Planning Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning
Focus on traffic → Focus on people
Primary objectives: Traffic flow
capacity and speed →
Primary objectives: Accessibility and quality of life,
including social equity, health and environmental quality,
and economic viability
Mode-focussed → Integrated development of all transport modes and shifttowards sustainable mobility
Infrastructure as the main topic → Combination of infrastructure, market, regulation,information and promotion
Sectoral planning document → Planning document consistent with related policy areas
Short and medium-term delivery
plan →
short and medium-term delivery plan embedded in a
long-term vision and strategy
Covering an administrative area → Covering a functional urban area based ontravel-to-work flows
Domain of traffic engineers → Interdisciplinary planning teams
Planning by experts → Planning with the involvement of stakeholders andcitizens using a transparent and participatory approach
Limited impact assessment → Systematic evaluation of impacts to facilitate learningand improvement
4. Insights from City Practice and Reflections on the Literature
The diffusion or transfer of policy innovations, and the cross-boundary convergence of policies
has long been researched in International Relations theory (IR) e.g., [13], comparative and European
Studies e.g., [14–16] and in the analysis of individual policy fields, including environmental policy
studies e.g., [17–19]. While the scope of the approaches might differ, all are concerned with the adoption
of policy innovations across different settings e.g., [7] (p. 267).
The following chapter provides a short review of the mechanisms of policy diffusion that IR,
European, comparative and environmental policy scholars have identified. The common starting point
is the observation that—under increasing international interdependencies—the implementation of
policy instruments not only depends on domestic considerations, but also on experiences and policy
implementation in other states [8]. While the horizontal diffusion of policies between national states
has been at the core of the research programme, some studies also considered the role of international
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institutions, including the European Union, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the
UNESCO [9,16]. Still, examining the attempts of a supra- or international institution to influence
subnational entities adds both another layer to the multi-level perspective and an actor perspective to
the existing literature.
Studies refer to a range of objects that are diffused, ranging from specific instruments, such as
feed-in tariffs for renewable energy sources [17,19] up to ideational frameworks and paradigms, such as
economic neoliberalism and deregulation [20–22]. Policy transfer and diffusion scholars observed five
broader mechanisms for how policies spread among states. The list consists of (1) formal hierarchy,
(2) coercion, (3) competition (4) learning and networking, and (5) the influence of international norm
entrepreneurs [6–8,13,20,23]. This chapter describes the main mechanisms of policy diffusion from the
literature and links them to evidence from the evaluation of the SUMPs Up project.
4.1. Fomral Hierarchy
Hierarchical policy diffusion refers to the imposition of policies through external actors, such as
powerful states or international institutions [24,25]. Formal hierarchy requires an explicit organisational
structure with clearly designed institutionalised relationships [26]. In the EU, formal hierarchical
steering occurs in areas in which the EU has exclusive competences (Art 3 TFEU) or where, under shared
competences (Art 4 TFEU), the EU can take action given this is more effective than action taken at
national, regional or local level. Art 5.3 TFEU states that, according to the principle of subsidiarity,
the EU “shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather
[ . . . ] be better achieved at Union level”.
Recipients of European legislation are usually the Member States. According to Article 258 TFEU,
the Member States and their central governments are responsible for ensuring compliance with EU law,
even if the responsibility lies with subnational bodies, such as city governments. Typical instruments
are EU directives that state policy objectives and define targets while leaving the implementation to the
individual member states. Still, some European environmental regulations de facto target transport
planning in urban agglomerations and prescribe specific policy actions: the Noise Directive (Directive
2002/49/EC) forces member states to ensure that “local competent authorities” in urban agglomerations
prepare noise maps and define action plans for the reduction in noise pollution. European air quality
legislation (Directive 2008/50/EC) requires that member states hold “the competent authorities and
bodies” in urban agglomerations responsible for complying with maximum concentrations of air
pollutants and for taking adequate measures when limits are exceeded. Specifically, larger cities and
regional authorities that participated in the SUMPs Up project mentioned that air pollution was one
major concern of urban mobility activities, and also one source of legitimacy for restricting car use,
and the European Court of Auditors found that air quality and noise regulations have “created a strong
incentive for cities to take action to avoid the risk of infringing environmental thresholds” [27] (p. 22).
Still, these regulations may trigger punctual shifts in planning practices, but are far from transmitting a
systematic approach to alter urban mobility planning practices.
While hierarchical steering through the EU environmental legislation directly targets cities
and urban agglomerations, the existing transport legislation does not systematically address urban
mobility planning [28]. Translated to the diffusion of the SUMP concept, European top down policy
transfer would force cities to adopt sustainable mobility plans and to implement planning practices
that correspond to the SUMP guideline. Transport is a shared responsibility between the EU and
the Member States, and the 2011 White Paper on transport called for examining “the possibility
of a mandatory approach for cities of a certain size, according to national standards based on EU
guidelines” [29]. Whether the EU had the competence to take hierarchical action on urban mobility—i.e.,
to force Member States to make sustainable urban mobility planning mandatory for cities within
their territory—was debated during the preparation of the European Urban Mobility Package [2].
Proponents of a mandatory approach argued that non-action would endanger the achievement of key
Sustainability 2020, 12, 8436 5 of 16
European objectives, including a competitive and resource-efficient transport system, the reduction
in GHG emissions air pollution and noise pollution reduce the effectiveness of businesses and hence
“impacting the well-being of virtually all populations, including those living in cities” [2] (pp. 17, 485).
One line of reasoning was to link urban mobility to the European Trans-European Network
(TEN-T) policy, under which DG MOVE has a strong influence on mobility policies: Articles 170
and 171 (2) of the TFEU empower the EU to “contribute to the establishment and development of
trans-European networks” and that the “Commission may, in close cooperation with the Member
States, take any useful initiative to promote such coordination” [30] (p. 28). It was argued that since
“urban congestion has a negative impact on inter-urban and cross-border travel, as most transport
starts and ends in urban areas” [2] (p. 14), urban mobility was an integral part of the Trans-European
Transport Network. The TEN-T Regulation (EU) No. 1315/20131 inter alia defines standards for
the development of roads, railway systems, waterways and airports that are part of the network.
Urban nodes and sustainable mobility are explicitly mentioned in the TEN-T Regulation, and the
Commission has the right to start up a procedure against Member States if their infrastructure is not
adapted to the requirements [31].
Although the impact assessment accompanying the 2013 urban mobility Communication [2]
found that making SUMPs mandatory for cities would be more effective than voluntary instruments,
the top-down approach was dismissed. Main arguments were the higher administrative costs, lower
flexibility and adaptability to national situations and city specific circumstances, and concerns that
mandatory approaches would reduce the commitment of cities. As a result, urban mobility was
addressed in a non-binding Communication from the Commission and did not proceed to a Directive
which would legally bind national governments to force “their” cities to adopt Sustainable Urban
Mobility Plans. Halpern found that European urban mobility policy making is lacking a consistent
regulatory framework, “heavily constrained by the strict understanding of the subsidiary principle”
and restricted to non-binding instruments [28] (p. 2537). More recently, the European Court of Auditors
found that “in the absence of legislative compulsion, there was limited take-up of the Commission’s
guidance on the part of many Member States and cities–notably in terms of preparing ‘Sustainable
Urban Mobility Plans’” [27] (p. 5).
Some Member States and regions, including France, the UK, Italy, Romania, Catalonia,
and Flanders made Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning mandatory for “their” cities [32]. Although
the EU was not formally involved, the diverging results of these cases provide valuable insights
into the factors that support or hamper hierarchical policy diffusion. The introduction of SUMP
was considered successful in forerunner countries that also provided national guidelines, funding
lines, knowledge centres, and a monitoring and evaluation framework [32]. Pflieger, for example,
describes that “European measures were used strategically by politicians and transport planners to
support the transformation of local policies in Toulouse and to legitimize the implementation of new
instruments” [33] (p. 336); or participants of the SUMPs Up project reported that, having a SUMP
enhanced planning departments’ legitimacy vis-à-vis political decision makers, specifically when
governments and political objectives changed.
On the other hand, we found strong evidence for only formal compliance in cases where a national
SUMP framework was missing. Specifically, representatives of Romanian cities reported that local
administrations were confronted with the task of preparing a SUMP without adequate personnel
resources, sufficient knowledge, or financial support. This resulted in mere formal compliance,
with urban mobility plans being developed by external consultants as “one size fits all” products
without involvement of the administration and often without taking the local circumstances into account.
To sum up, formal hierarchy cannot sufficiently explain the diffusion of the SUMP concept in
the EU. DG MOVE lacks the legal power to force cities to adopt urban mobility plans. Hierarchical
impact on decision making can be observed punctually—for example, related to air pollution and,
as explained below, the access to financial support. This confirms the findings of Halpern that European
regulations do influence urban mobility decisions, but mostly under the supervision of DGs other
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than DG MOVE. This import of policy instruments from external non-transport policy fields, which
build upon their particular agendas and interests, inhibited a coherent urban mobility policy on the EU
level [28] (p. 2534). Still, experience from Member States and regions that implemented hierarchical
steering by making sustainable urban mobility planning mandatory showed that support from the
national level was crucial to achieve a profound change in mobility planning practices beyond mere
formal compliance.
4.1.1. Coercion and Conditionality
Coercion is another, less formalised, kind of hierarchical steering. This mechanism exploits
power asymmetries and dependencies between actors—for example, between international financing
institutions and developing states [7,23,34]. The access to financial resources can be linked to
conditionalities, such as the adaptation of specific policies. Bulmer and Pagett found that conditionality
is commonly used to spread procedural standards, such as the SUMP approach, rather than specific
policy instruments [24] (p. 109). Gore observed, for example, that major donors, such as the World
Bank, linked financial aid to the implementation of sector liberalisation policies [34].
Access to European funding and financing programmes is one key concern for cities when
implementing mobility measures [35]. During the SUMPs Up evaluation, several interviewees claimed
that one motivation for formulating SUMP was to easier access European funding sources for mobility
projects. Hence, one could expect that the Commission exploits this dependence strategically, by making
funding and financing arrangements for transport-related investments contingent on the adoption
of sustainable urban mobility planning practices [24] (p. 109). To which degree the Commissions
uses conditionality for spreading the SUMP concept is explored below, for its main funding and
financing institutions, namely the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and the European
Investment Bank (EIB).
The ESIF is the central funding mechanism of the European regional development and cohesion
policy. It consists of five funding programmes, including the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund, which are particularly relevant for funding urban mobility projects.
For the 2014–2020 programming period, the European Cohesion Policy has set 11 thematic objectives,
including the shift towards a low-carbon economy and the promotion of sustainable transport [36].
In fact, the current provisions for European support programmes stress that Member States should
focus on sustainable forms of transport and sustainable urban mobility and prioritise measures
according to their contribution to mobility, sustainability, and the reduction in GHG emissions [37]
(Annex I). The ESIF’s Guidance Fiche for Sustainable Multimodal Urban Mobility [38] explicitly refers
to sustainable urban mobility plans, but states that the current legislation offers no legal basis for
making sustainable urban mobility plans mandatory when asking for ESIF support. The European
Court of Auditors found that EU funded projects “were not always based on sound urban mobility
strategies” what strongly compromised their effectiveness [27] (p. 38).
In 2020, the Commission assessed the progress on the implementation of the TEN-T network for
the years 2016–2017 [39]. The report shows that the shares of transport-related expenditures by mode
vary considerably between the funding and financing mechanisms. On the one hand, the Connective
Europe Facility (CEF), which is managed by INEA, focuses on sustainable modes (railways and
waterways), and only used seven per cent of its transport funding for road projects. On the other
hand, the European regional development and cohesion policy retains a strong focus on roads with
almost 80 per cent of transport funding going to such infrastructure. Multimodal transport, which is at
the core of SUMP planning, only plays a marginal role. This focus on focus on car- and truck-based
mobility shows the lack of SUMP mainstreaming across the Commission’s DGs and, in the end, is likely
to compromise the establishment of sustainable urban mobility systems in European cities. Figure 1
shows the allocation of transport funding by mobility mode under the CEF and the ESIF.
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The European Investment Bank (EIB) is publicly owned by the EU Member States and provides
loans and financial support, inter alia for major infrastructure projects in cities. The EIB’s 2011 Transport
Lending Policy explicitly claims that “standalone projects that are not part of an integrated urban
mobility plan are unlikely to be effective in reducing congestion and environmental externalities and
should not be supported”. In fact, both the absolute amount and the share of EIB financing that was
dedicated to road projects decreased between 2013 and 2019, which ight be an indication for the
increased uptake of sustainability concerns in the EIB lending policy (Figure 2).
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 17 
 
Figure 1. CEF and ESIF Transport Funding 2016/2017. Data Source: COM(2020) 433 final [39]. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is publicly owned by the EU ember States and provides 
loans and fin cial support, i ter alia for major infrastructure projects in cities. The EIB’s 2011 
Transport Lending Policy explicitly claims that “standalone projects that are not part of an integrated 
urban mobility plan are unlike y to be effective in redu ing congestion and environm ntal 
externalities and should not b  supported”. In fact, both the absolute amount and the share of EIB 
financing that was dedicated to road projects decreased between 2013 and 2019, whic  might be an 
ind cation for the increased uptake of sus ainability concerns in the EIB lending policy (Figur  2). 
 
Figure 2. Share of EIB project financing dedicated to road projects (EIB projects that explicitly mention 
motorways, expressways, Autobahn, or road tunnel in the short description) in the EU related to the 
t tal EIB project financing in the EU. Data Source: EIB list of financed proj cts 
(https://www. ib.org/e /projects/loans/). Selection criteria: transport; European Union; 2013–2019. 
Notwithstanding, this general shift from car-oriented project financing to other modes, EIB 
financing for urban mobility is not subject to any specific restriction [40]. Having an integrated urban 
mobility plan is a select on criterion—but not an exclusion cri erion—for applications to the financing 
mechanisms. B sides this weak conditionality, the overall i fluence of EIB financing o  urban 
mobility syst ms across th  EU is limited due to the required size of investments: EIB financing is 
Figure 2. Share of EIB project financing dedicated to road projects (EIB projects that explicitly
mention motorways, expressways, Autobahn, or road tunnel in the short description) in the EU
related to the total EIB project financing in the EU. Data Source: EIB list of financed projects (https:
//www.eib.org/en/projects/loans/). Selection criteria: transport; European Union; 2013–2019.
Notwithstanding, this general shift from car-oriented project financing to other modes,
EIB financing for urban mobility is not subject to any specific restriction [40]. Having an integrated
urban mobility plan is a selection criterion—but not an exclusion criterion—for applications to the
financing mechanisms. Besides this weak conditionality, the overall influence of EIB financing on
urban mobility systems across the EU is limited due to the required size of investments: EIB financing
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is confined to projects with total investment costs over 50 million Euros, which is beyond the scope of
most smaller and medium sized cities—which is by far biggest share of European cities.
To sum up, there is evidence that compliance with the SUMP approach is increasingly considered
in some European financing institutions and funding programmes. Still, strict compliance with the
SUMP principles is not mandatory in order to profit from EU funding and financing [27], despite this
being demanded by the European Parliament in 2009 and in the Commission’s 2011 White Paper on
transport [41] (p. 23). As mentioned above, most financing and funding programmes are not under the
immediate control of DG Move and follow own rationalities—which are not necessarily aligned with
DG MOVE’s objective of spreading the SUMP approach. The lack of policy integration and SUMP
mainstreaming is reflected in the persistently high share of road investment in the European regional
and cohesion policy—despite ESIF’s formal backing of the SUMP approach in its public guiding
documents. For the upcoming 2021–2027 programming period, the European Court of Auditors has
been suggested to make the existence of SUMP a mandatory requirement to access EU funding for
urban mobility investments [27] (p. 38), [42].
4.1.2. Competition
Approaches that refer to regulatory competition [43] among states as the main driving mechanism
of policy diffusion claim that actors adopt policy instruments strategically, in order to improve their
position vis-à-vis their competitors. Policies in different political settings—mostly countries, but
also regions and cities—are expected to converge with increasing competitive pressure between
these settings [44] (p. 26). Hence, competition requires a market on which actors compete over
scarce resources—for example when trying to attract business and investments to their territory [23]
(p. 1247). The assumed consequences of this mechanism are twofold: some scholars argue that under
increasing international interdependency, governments could refrain from unilaterally implementing
policies to avoid disadvantages compared to other countries or even lower regulations to attract new
enterprises. This race-to-the-bottom ultimately leads to policy convergence in the sense that certain
policies are relaxed or not implemented [45]. Examples are the non-implementation, the reduction or
the abandonment of corporate taxes, environmental deregulation, or diminishing fuel taxes [46,47].
Conversely, other scholars claim that competition can foster the diffusion of stricter standards,
when access restriction to important markets push other countries to adapt to these standards and
initiate a “race-to-the top” [48,49]. Holzinger et al. suggest that countries that already have demanding
regulatory standards and frameworks in place try to upload their national approach to the European
level in order to “minimising the institutional costs of adjusting domestic regulatory arrangements to
EU policy requirements”, which would, in the end, result in stricter European standards [44].
On a local small scale, interviews found anecdotal evidence for a regulatory competition [43]
(p. 876) which led to a “race to the bottom” between neighbouring communities. For example,
cities refrained from increasing parking fees in their city centres so as not to lose customers to
neighbouring cities with lower rates. This finding is in line with the strategic behaviour that Baybeck
et al. or Shipan and Volden expect under neighbouring states or cities [46,47].
Beyond such examples under immediate spatial proximity, there is also evidence for a “race to
the top”. Cities compete to attract new businesses and residents, claiming to be the most liveable or
innovative city [47] (p. 843). Pflieger notes that “local authorities mobilize strongly on a European
level in order to distinguish themselves”, leading to a strong political competition between cities
at a European level and reinforcing a network of innovative cities [33] (p. 331). In her assessment
of certification systems, Kern notes that “leading cities join certification schemes [ . . . ], apply for
awards and participate in rankings [ . . . ] to brand the city as ‘sustainable city’, ‘green city’, ‘smart city’,
etc.” [14] (p. 132), [50]. Under these circumstances, one could expect that highly visible mobility
awards and prices can promote a race-to-the-top for the most sustainable urban mobility systems or
the most innovative planning practices. Indeed, the Commission and other members of the SUMP
community have implemented a number of contests, including the European Mobility Week Awards,
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the Award for Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning, or the CIVITAS Awards [41] (see also the section
on networking). Sustainable urban mobility is also one evaluation criterion for the Commission’s
Green Leaf Award. Hence, the European Commission can be understood as an initiator and facilitator
of competition on sustainable urban mobility.
An earlier impact assessment of the European Action Plan on Urban Mobility which was conducted
in 2013 [41] acknowledged the high visibility and contribution of mobility awards to raise awareness
for sustainable urban mobility. The immediate outreach of these competition, however, is limited.
For example, only 11 cities applied for the 2019 CIVITAS Awards; the target group mainly consists of
already convinced forerunner cities. Still, beyond this immediate impact, competition can contribute
to setting a standard for urban mobility measures and to raising benchmarks, as depicted in chapter 4.
4.2. Networks and Learning
In the absence of hierarchical top-down prescriptions, decision-making and policy implementation
remains in the hands of individual states or sub-national entities. The active search for policy solutions
and the selection of appropriate measures burdens local administrations with additional transaction
costs. Rational or instrumental learning approaches claim that, to reduce this extra effort, decision
makers may “simplify the task of finding a solution by choosing an alternative that has proven
successful elsewhere” [46] (p. 505). Reference to tested and proven solutions reduces the uncertainty
about impacts, can help overcome political resistance and, in the end, lead to policy convergence [7,8].
Jänicke and Wurzel claim that such lesson-drawing is widespread in the European climate governance
system and that it “may offer followers a shortcut to innovative solutions and/or reduce their domestic
learning costs” [51] (p. 23). International institutions, such as the World Bank, the UNESCO, or the
UNDP, can act as information providers and facilitators of exchange—for example, as sponsors of
studies or as organisers of international conferences for policymakers and experts [52] (p. 32).
The lack of personnel resources and specialist expertise is a key barrier to the implementation
of innovative policy measures, specifically in smaller cities [53]. A facilitated exchange among peer
countries or cities and the provision of processed expert information through learning programmes
may reduce costs and favour the uptake of measures that proved to be successful in similar settings.
Moreover, targeted capacity building programmes and participation in networks can bridge the gap
between larger and more innovative communities and cities with less capacities [54] (p. 52) [43]
(p. 828). Studies on the diffusion of climate policies found that the likeliness of countries to adopt
policies increases with their interactions with forerunner countries that already have climate policies in
place [18] (p. 479). A number of sustainability-related city networks emerged between the mid-1980s
and the early 1990s, including ICLEI, Eurocities, the Union of Baltic Cities and Polis, which is a network
of cities and regions with a specific focus on sustainable mobility. The existence of city and regional
networks is considered to strongly support the diffusion of policies among their members [14,55].
As described above, the institutionalisation process of a European urban mobility policy was
stalled and remained at the stage of building networks and collecting expertise, instead of moving
on towards a genuinely European policy field. As a result, Halpern found that “the EU emerges as
a network facilitator, but not as a regulator” in the policy field [28] (p. 2539). In fact, the European
Commission strongly supports the production, the processing and the dissemination of knowledge on
sustainable urban mobility planning. The Commission has initialised a variety of networking initiatives
to support sustainable urban mobility initiatives [41]. For example, the European Commission launched
and finances the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, which acts as a platform for sharing
action plans and good practice examples, arranges learning events, or provides expert advice [51]
(p. 28). DG MOVE finances the eltis Mobility Observatory, which is a networking and support platform
for cities. Eltis facilitates the exchange of information, knowledge and experience on sustainable
urban mobility planning and hosts the SUMP guidelines, which were developed through a network of
mobility experts, The European Commission launched and co-funds the CIVITAS city network, which
is dedicated to the promotion of cleaner and better urban mobility systems [41]. CIVITAS supports
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research and demonstration projects and living labs, offers learning programmes, arranges study visits,
or provides a tool database for mobility practitioners. The annual CIVITAS Forum provides a venue
for the dissemination of good practice examples, and the exchange among cities, decision makers and
mobility experts. Moreover, the Commission’s DGs finance research projects and coordination and
support actions on sustainable urban mobility with strong involvement of city partners under the EU’s
main research programme Horizon2020, or under the Interreg Programme.
Learning and network facilitation forms the core of DG MOVEs activities to spread the SUMP
concept among European cities. It addresses one key concern of city administrations by providing
knowledge and supporting capacity building. Still, experience from European learning events suggest
that the success of learning programmes depends on the transferability of good practice examples
to the recipient’s context. The applicability of many measures and instruments is subject to national
legislation, such as whether cities are allowed to raise congestion charges [40], or national limits on
the fees for resident parking permits. Finally, the implementation of mobility measures critically
depends on political support on the local level. Interviews confirmed that having a SUMP increases the
administrations’ legitimacy, sets a long-term direction for urban mobility planning, but implementing
measures often required the consent of political decision makers.
4.3. International Norms
Scholars that emphasize the role of international norms argue that actors align their behaviour to
what is societally considered appropriate. States comply with international norms to demonstrate that
they are part of their peer community, to gain international reputation, to demonstrate the country’s
modernity and to avoid the stigma of backwardness [6–8,13]. The emergence and recognition of
international norms can encourage states to adopt practices, institutions, and political processes on the
domestic or city level.
Some researchers understand norm based policy diffusion as a blind and unreflected emulation of
social leaders, often resulting in inefficient and ill-aligned policies [6] (p. 272): “Governments may
imitate what peer countries do simply because they are peers, or governments may imitate what
apparently successful countries do simply because they are high-status countries that are considered
to know best” [22] (p. 73). Other scholars, however, claim that emerging international norms can
challenge the understanding of problems and adequate policy responses—i.e., they address the ideas
behind the policy or program, promote new ways of talking about and understanding issues and
change the reasoning which actions are considered legitimate [13,20].
Following this “logic of appropriateness” argument, policy diffusion via international norms is
related to learning and networking mechanisms as described above, and often uses similar channels
for the diffusion of policies. However, diffusion via international norms goes beyond instrumental
learning about policy instruments. In his highly referenced article, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning,
and the State”, Peter Hall distinguishes between three orders of political learning. While first and
second order learning comprises the adoption and adjustment policy instruments to solve a given and
undisputed issue, third order change fundamentally alters norms, or the prevalent policy paradigm.
Paradigm changes concern the “framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals
of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the
problems they are meant to be addressing” [56] (p. 279). Accordingly, norm based policy transfer often
relates to formal and informal rules and procedures that guide decision-making processes rather than
to specific policy instruments [57].
Norms often emerge in individual states and are then taken up and disseminated through
international organisations that act as norm entrepreneurs [13] (p. 895), [58] (p. 227).
Norm entrepreneurs can define specific policies or instruments as “an attractive symbol of modernity
or a normatively appropriate model and thus induce many countries to enhance their legitimacy by
importing the new policy scheme” [7] (p. 274). For example, related to education and the concept
of life-long learning, Kleibrink states that the EU institutions problematised an “allegedly out-dated
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understanding of education” and instead promoted the paradigm of lifelong learning” [59] (p. 72);
or Barnett and Finnemore argue that the International Monetary Fund defined what “good economy”
is for its members [60] (p. 33).
International networks of practitioners and scientists can play an important role in shaping
problem conceptualisations and the determination of “adequate” solutions in policy subsystems.
Beyond the provision of information and good practice examples, the establishment of transnational
networks of practitioners, policy makers and experts allows for transnational problem solving—i.e.,
the joint development of problem definition and solutions [16] (p. 784). In the literature, such networks
are often referred to as epistemic communities [61] or advocacy coalitions [62]. Their members share a
common problem conceptualisation and promote “adequate” instruments to deal with the problem.
They may exert influence by capturing advisory bodies or by staffing key positions in international
organisations with members of their community and thus determining their agendas and rationales.
As shown in Table 1, the SUMP concept can be conceived as a new planning paradigm, that aims
at replacing “traditional” planning practices with a radically new concept that focuses on people rather
than on traffic, and sectoral expert planning with strong elements of policy integration, participation
and consultation. The SUMP approach is embedded in a broader discourse on sustainable mobility
that questions the (car-)traffic centred “predict and provide” approach [9–11], and which promotes
mobility planning “to reduce the need to travel [ . . . ], to encourage modal shift, to reduce trip lengths
and to encourage greater efficiency in the transport system” [10]. This avoid–shift–improve framework,
which was developed in the early 1990s [63,64] includes integrated land-use and urban planning to
reduce trip lengths, the use of ICT technologies to replace physical travel, measures to shift private car
use to sustainable transport modes (i.e., discouraging car use by pricing measures that partially reflect
the true costs of car transport to society) or technological innovations to improve the efficiency of the
transport system.
Hence, with the SUMP concept, the European Commission promotes social expectations of
adequate planning practices. These expectations link to broader normative discourses on policy
integration and civil society participation. A policy paradigm is “a cognitive model shared by a
particular community of actors, and which facilitates problem solving” [65] (p. 38). These shared beliefs
“structure how problems are understood and which instruments are adequate to solve them [56] (p. 278).
Paradigms materialise, for example, in the selection of performance indicators or in institutional
arrangements, such as in the configuration of government departments [66] (p. 271).
Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning or similar practices had been well established in some
European states and regions, notably in France, the UK, Catalonia, or Flanders [60]. These countries
and regions, however, have not systematically promoted the transnational dissemination of the SUMP
concept. Instead, this role has been taken on by the European Commission and an international
transdisciplinary community of mobility experts, scientists, NGOs, forerunner cities, individual
practitioners and city networks [28] (p. 2531). The community is shaped through exchange at
recurring conferences (including the CIVITAS Forum or the Eltis Conference series), and cooperation
in transdisciplinary research projects and demonstration actions, which, in the largest part, are funded
by the Commission. The implicit role of the community is to provide external advice to the European
Commission and its implementing agencies, to organise training programmes for cities, to prepare
issue-specific manuals for practitioners, or to highlight good practice examples of sustainable planning
practices. Building on the expertise of the sustainable urban mobility community, the European
Commission acts as norm entrepreneur and aims at “normalising” SUMP as standard planning
approach in European city administrations.
The evaluation of the SUMPs Up learning programme provided evidence that a number of
participants “understood” the new planning paradigm. Still, in its 2018 analysis of the state of SUMP
in European member states, Durlin found persisting “traditional transport planning approaches
focused on infrastructure and motorised traffic, which results in other transport related measures being
prioritized over SUMP measures” [32] (p. 65). According to one interviewee, it took 15 years after
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the mandatory introduction of SUMP in France (in 1996, Plan de Déplacements Urbains) until a “new
planning mentality” emerged from these new rules.
Although this information was not systemically collected, the evaluation of SUMPs Up provided
some potential explications for the resistance of the “traditional” planning paradigm. Interviewees
mentioned that a change in university curricula would not address the current planners’ mindsets or
that priority for private motorised mobility was deeply inscribed in national legislation. Representatives
of German cities, for example, suggested that the existing transport and road laws aim at ensuring
undisturbed flow of car traffic, and that measures that challenged this objective, including speed
limits or redistribution of road space to other modes, were considered as a disturbance and required
profound justification.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Applying the policy transfer and diffusion framework to the field of urban mobility in the EU
has shown that, despite the incomplete institutionalisation of a European Urban Mobility Policy [28],
the European Commission actively promotes the diffusion of sustainable urban mobility planning
practices in European municipalities. We also found that the Commission’s DGs took different roles
with varying intensities: (1) as enforcer of environmental regulations that punctually influence urban
mobility planning; (2) as a user of weak conditionality in financing and funding arrangements; (3) as
initiator of competition for the most advanced planning processes; (4) as facilitator of instrumental
learning and networking; (5) as norm entrepreneur and part of a network of experts and practitioners
that aims at fundamentally changing the urban mobility planning paradigm. Hence, these mechanisms
are not mutually exclusive, but are employed in parallel.
The findings also suggest that the individual mechanisms target different groups of municipalities,
from forerunners to laggard cities. This resonates with insights from the models of change literature
that explore the introduction and diffusion of social innovations [67] (Figure 3). Forerunners—i.e.,
those cities that are already experienced and well advanced in their planning practices—form part of
the SUMP community and are attracted by competition and innovative actions. They contribute to
the advancement of SUMP concept and may serve as role models for follower cities. Follower cities
have already taken the decision to apply the SUMP concept and seek knowledge on how to implement
planning practices. Participants of SUMPs Up learning activities wanted to avoid transactions costs by
learning from peer cities, sought reassurance that they are on the right track and legitimacy vis-à-vis
volatile political environments. Finally, pressure on laggard cities that have not been considered to
adapt their planning practices or are not yet aware of the concept can be exerted through binding
environmental regulations and conditionality in funding and financing arrangements.
While voluntary forms of policy diffusion are well addressed through the provision of networking
and learning opportunities or formalised competition for the most innovative planning practices,
hierarchical steering remains punctual and dependent on other DGs’ agendas. Besides the time
lag between the adoption of new planning practices and observable impacts on mobility behaviour,
DG MOVE’s weakness in regard to hierarchical steering and a lack of SUMP mainstreaming across the
DGs may explain the persistence of unsustainable mobility patterns despite the broad take up of the
SUMP concept. Still, evidence from countries that have made SUMPs compulsory for their major cities
showed that imposed regulations are prone to only formal compliance. This suggests that a successful
diffusion of the SUMP approach that encourages forerunners, supports followers and pushes laggards
towards more sustainable urban mobility planning processes requires a combination of all transfer
mechanisms, including the strengthening of hierarchical elements. This article attempted to highlight
several of these aspects, which also provides starting points for further research on the impacts of a
new planning paradigm on urban mobility systems and behavioural change.
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